An OpenFlow switch in an OpenFlow environment includes an?attack determination module to collect statistical information on packet processing with respect to incoming packets to be processed in the OpenFlow switch at a predetermined period interval to determine whether a?DDoS?attack?occurs. The Openflow switch also includes an?attack?responding module to perceive a feature of the?DDoS?attack?by using the incoming packets introduced into the OpenFlow switch after the determination of the occurrence of the?DDoS?attack?and process the incoming packets in line with the perceived feature of the?DDoS?attack. Therefore, it is possible to determine and responds to?DDoS?attacks in the OpenFlow switches.

FIELD

The present invention relates to a technique of processing a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)?attack?in an OpenFlow environment, and more particularly, to a DDoS?attack?processing apparatus and method in OpenFlow switches to receive incoming packets, which is capable of determining and responding to?DDoS attacks in the OpenFlow switches.

BACKGROUND

An OpenFlow technique is a technique to construct a virtual network optimized in each service on a physical network for operation of the virtual network. The virtual network includes an OpenFlow controller for controlling centrally the entire network, OpenFlow switches for processing incoming data packets that are introduced into the OpenFlow switches under a control scheme settled by the OpenFlow controller, and an OpenFlow protocol that is responsible for communication between the OpenFlow switch and the OpenFlow controller.

On the other hand, a?DDoS?attack?is an attempt to employ several hundred of thousands of zombie PCs and send massive?attack?traffics to a target server causing the server to deny normal services.

The?DDoS?attack?may occur even in an OpenFlow environment. More specifically, at the time of the receipt of unrecognized incoming packets, the switches send signaling messages to the controller, and the controller then transfers processing information related to the packets to all the switches that need to participate in processing the packets. For example, if the number of the switches under the control of the controller is ‘N‘, and all the switches participate in the packet processing, the controller generates the maximum ‘N‘ number of signaling messages to transfer them to all the switches. In other words, in order to process one new flow, the controller should process the maximum N+1 number of signaling messages.

Meanwhile, a?DDoS?attacker generates several hundred of thousands of flows exploiting several hundred of thousands of zombie PCs (assuming it to be M) that the switches are not recognizable to?attack?the switches. The switches inquire of the controller how to process the M number of unrecognizable flows in such a manner as described above, and hence the controller should process the maximum M*(N+1) number of signaling messages.

That is, the reason why the?DDoS?attack?in the OpenFlow environment results in obstacles much larger than an existing?DDoS?attack?is that the attacker attacks all the switches managed by the controller, i.e., the N number of switches, instead of attacking only one switch. In this case, the controller needs to process as many as the N*M*(N+1) number of signaling messages. The processing of these messages causes the controller to fall into a denial of services. For example, it is assumed that the controller manages 10 numbers of switches, the attacker produces 100,000 numbers of flows, and an?attack?is performed by changing source IPs and ports every minute. The controller?10?then processes ten million or more signaling packets per minute, which results in falling into a denial of service.

In the OpenFlow environment, the other serious security vulnerability is that, in the technical nature, it is extremely difficult to determine whether a?DDoS?attackoccurs. In general, the determination of the occurrence of the?DDoS?attackneeds to perceive header information of the incoming packets in real-time and rapidly identify an unusual feature of the?attack?traffics, for example, a sudden increase in a ratio of ICMP packets to overall traffics. In other words, the determination of the?DDoS?attack?can be achieved by an apparatus or module that is capable of observing the header information of all incoming packets in real time.

The OpenFlow is a technique which allows the controller to dedicate to a network and flow control function and the switches to dedicate to only packet forwarding in a manner as prescribed by the controller. Therefore, the determination of the?DDoS?attack?is done by the controller, which is responsible for control functions. This leads to a security vulnerability in the OpenFlow technology. As mentioned above, it is because that whether the?DDoS?attackoccurs should be made through the inspection of the packet header information, but these packet-processing task is done by the switches used to role of packet forwarding instead of the controller. In other words, the reason is that the controller, which is responsible for determining whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs, receives only information on the overview of the number of packets, the number of bytes and the like that are processed and transmitted by the switches every particular cycle and does not process the packets.

Therefore, there are limitations in determining whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs with only the overview information in terms of overhead, in terms of time, and in terms of accuracy. First, from the standpoint of time, the controller receives information from the switches at least two or three times at a specific periodic interval, compares between the differences of the received information, and roughly estimates whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs. After that, for accurate judgment, the controller sends signaling messages onto the switches, requests the switches to transmit detailed information necessary for detecting the?DDoSattack, and receives the detailed information to determine whether the?attackfinally occurs. When it is determined that the?attack?has happened, a countermeasure should be established and transferred back to the switches via signaling messages for setting the switches. During that time, the OpenFlow network has already damaged by an attacker.

Secondly, in terms of overhead, the controller requests the switches to send the detailed information necessary to determine whether the?attack?occurs. In this regard, the controller may request only the number of packets and number of bytes that have been processed by each interface of the switches, but the controller may request detailed information on the number of packets and number of bytes that have been processed by a group, by a table and by its table entry as well as by the interface of the switches in order to increase the accuracy. However, the information may be a significant overhead to the controller since the number of table entries amounts to several thousand to several tens of thousands and the controller requests the detailed information of all the switches that are managed by the controller. Further, as mentioned above, the controller additionally process as many as the total N*M*(N+1) number of signaling messages every minute, and hence the controller becomes rapidly fall into a denial of service.

Finally, in terms of accuracy, the?DDoS?attack?can be typically determined as a signature-based?attack?and a behavior-based?attack. However, it is difficult for the controller to determine accurately whether the signature-based?attack?and behavior-based?attack?occur through the use of only the information on the number of packets and bytes that can be obtained from the switches.

As such, it is difficult to determine whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs with only the overview information sent by the switches, and even if determined, not only it may take a long time for the determination, but also the accuracy of the determination may degrade significantly.

Even if the controller successfully determines the occurrence of the?DDoS?attackbased on statistical information that has been sent from the switches, the most difficult problem is to judge which flow is sent by the attacker and which source is a zombie PC.

This is the reason that the processing on the packets is directly done on the switches with no responding capability against the?DDoS?attack, but the?DDoSattack?substantially happens in the controller to take advantage of statistical-based indirect information that is transmitted from the switches.

As mentioned earlier, therefore, the response to the?DDoS?attack?should be made on an apparatus that can inspect the header information of all the incoming packets in real time, e.g., the switches for the OpenFlow technology.

SUMMARY

In view of the above, the present invention provides an apparatus and method for determining whether a?DDoS?attack?occurs and responding to the?DDoS?attack, which is mounted in OpenFlow switches and capable of determining whether theDDoS?attack?occurs and responding to the?DDoS?attack?by the switches themselves.

In accordance with an aspect of the exemplary embodiment of the present invention, there is provided an OpenFlow switch in an OpenFlow environment, which includes: an?attack?determination module configured to collect statistical information on packet processing with respect to incoming packets to be processed in the OpenFlow switch at a predetermined period interval to determine whether a?DDoS?attack?occurs; and an?attack?responding module configured to perceive a feature of the?DDoS?attack?by using the incoming packets introduced into the OpenFlow switch after the determination of the occurrence of the?DDoS?attack?and process the incoming packets in line with the perceived feature of the?DDoS?attack.

In the embodiment, the?attack?determination module includes: a packet capture unit configured to capture the incoming packets introduced into the OpenFlow switch when the occurrence of the?DDoS?attack?is determined, wherein the captured packets are provided to the?attack?responding module.

In the embodiment, the?attack?determination module is configured to determine whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs based on the number of packets or bytes processed every a predetermined period and a predetermined threshold.

In the embodiment, the?attack?responding module includes: a signature-based responding unit configured to determine whether the signature-based?attack?DDoS?occurs by analyzing the overall traffics occurred in the OpenFlow switch and the traffics occurred in ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol), TCP (Transmission Control Protocol), UDP (User Datagram Protocol), or HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) and performs a disposal process for the incoming packets; and a behavior-based responding unit configured to determine whether a behavior-based?attack?occurs by analyzing the incoming packet when it is determined that the?attack?is not the signature-based?attack?and performs a disposal process for the incoming packets.

In the embodiment, the signature-based responding unit is configured to determine: that the signature-based?attack?is an ICMP?attack?when a ratio of ICMP traffics to the overall traffics is larger than a predetermined threshold of an ICMP traffic ratio; that the signature-based?attack?is a TCP?attack?when a ratio of TCP traffics to the overall traffics is larger than a predetermined threshold of a TCP traffic ratio; that the signature-based?attack?is a UDP?attack?when a ratio of UDP traffics to the overall traffics is larger than a predetermined threshold of a UDP traffic ratio; and that the signature-based?attack?is an HTTP?attack?when a ratio of HTTP traffics to the overall traffics is larger than a predetermined threshold of an HTTP traffic ratio.

In the embodiment, the signature-based?attack?responding unit is configured to perform a disposal process for the incoming packets related to the protocol under the signature-based?attack.

In the embodiment, the OpenFlow switch further includes an information collection module configured to collect the feature of the?DDoS?attack?and stores the collected feature in a database.

In the embodiment, the?attack?determination module is configured to determine that the?DDoS?attack?occurs based on the feature of the?DDoS?attack?stored in the database.

In the embodiment, the?attack?responding module is configured to perceive the?DDoS?attack?based on the feature of theDDoS?attack?stored in the database.

In accordance with another aspect of the exemplary embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a method for processing a?DDoS?attack?using an OpenFlow switch in an OpenFlow environment, which includes: collecting statistical information on packet processing with respect to incoming packets to be processed in the OpenFlow switch at a predetermined period interval; determining whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs on a basis of the collected statistical information on packet processing; perceiving a feature of the?DDoS?attack?using the incoming packets introduced into the OpenFlow switch when it is determined that the?DDoS?attack?has happened; and processing the incoming packets in line with the feature of the?DDoS?attack.

In the embodiment, the determining whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs comprises determining whether the?DDoS?attackoccurs based on the number of packets or bytes processed every a predetermined period and a predetermined threshold.

In the embodiment, the processing the incoming packets includes: determining whether a signature-based?attack?DDoSoccurs by analyzing the overall traffics occurred in the OpenFlow switch and the traffics occurred in ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol), TCP (Transmission Control Protocol), UDP (User Datagram Protocol), or HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol); determining whether a behavior-based?attack?occurs by analyzing the incoming packet when it is determined that the signature-based?attack?has not happened; and processing the incoming packets related to the determined?attack?by discarding them.

In the embodiment, the determining that the signature-based?attack?occurs includes: determining that the signature-basedattack?is an ICMP?attack?when a ratio of ICMP traffics to the overall traffics is larger than a first predetermined threshold; if the ratio of ICMP traffics is equal to or less than the first predetermined threshold, determining that the signature-basedattack?is a TCP?attack?when a ratio of TCP traffics to the overall traffics is larger than a second predetermined threshold; if the ratio of TCP traffics is equal to or less than the second predetermined threshold, determining that the signature-basedattack?is a UDP?attack?when a ratio of UDP traffics to the overall traffics is larger than a third predetermined threshold; and if the ratio of UDP traffics is equal to or less than the third predetermined threshold, determining that the signature-basedattack?is an HTTP?attack?when a ratio of HTTP traffics to the overall traffics is larger than a four predetermined threshold.

In the embodiment, the method further includes: collecting the features of the perceived?DDoS?attack; and storing the collected features in a database.

In accordance with the embodiments of the present invention, the apparatus for determining whether the?DDoS?attackoccurs and responding to the?DDoS?attack?is installed in the respective OpenFlow switches, thereby minimizing the load due to the massive messages sent to the controller at the time of the?DDoS?attack?while rapidly returning the OpenFlow network to a stable state.

Also, in terms of time, overhead and accuracy, as compared to the conventional controller-based device for defending against the?DDoS?attack?using the limited state information, the apparatus for determining whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs and responding to the?DDoS?attack?of the embodiment demonstrates the excellent defense performance against the?DDoSattack, and, therefore, a customized network can be further stably provided to a service provider trying to create a new service through the use of the OpenFlow technology.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The above and other objects and features of the present invention will become apparent from the following description of the embodiments given in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which:

FIG. 1?is a network diagram illustrating an OpenFlow technology to which an exemplary embodiment of the present invention is applied;

FIG. 2?shows a configuration of an OpenFlow switch in accordance with an exemplary embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 3?is a block diagram of a?DDoS?attack?processing apparatus in accordance with an exemplary embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 4?illustrates a flow chart of a process for determining whether a?DDoS?attack?occurs and responding to the?DDoSattack?performed by the?DDoS?attack?processing apparatus shown in?FIG. 1?in accordance with an exemplary embodiment of the present invention; and

FIG. 5?illustrates a flow chart of a process for responding to the?DDoS?attack?in accordance with an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Before describing the exemplary embodiment, an OpenFlow technology to which the exemplary embodiment is applied will be described as follows.

FIG. 1?is a network diagram illustrating an OpenFlow technology to which an exemplary embodiment of the present invention is applied.

Referring to?FIG. 1, a virtual network to which the embodiment is applied includes an OpenFlow controller?110?for controlling centrally the entire network, a plurality of OpenFlow switches?120?for processing incoming data packets that are introduced into the OpenFlow switches under a control scheme settled by the OpenFlow controller?110, an OpenFlow protocol?130?that is responsible for communication between the OpenFlow controller?110?and the OpenFlow switches?120, and a terminal?140?such as a personal computer for transmitting the data packets to the OpenFlow switches?120?and receiving the data packets through the OpenFlow switches?120. Also, each of the OpenFlow switches?120?may be constructed with a hardware part having a flow table for processing the data packets and a software part for providing a secure channel.

Following is a description on a process performed when a new flow is introduced into the virtual network optimized to serve a particular service.

First, when data packets of a new flow are introduced into the OpenFlow switches?120, the OpenFlow switches?120transmit signaling packets to inquire of the OpenFlow controller?110?how to process the flow since they have no processing information on the flow to which the packets belongs.

The OpenFlow controller?110?decides a processing method for the flow on a basis of status information of the OpenFlow switches?120?on the virtual network and transmits the processing method to all the OpenFlow switches?120?to which the packets belonging to the flow are delivered.

The OpenFlow switches?120, in response to the receipt of the processing method, processes the incoming packets in line with the processing method.

In the exemplary embodiment of the present invention, the OpenFlow switches?120?are designed to determine whether an exterior invasion, e.g., a?DDoS?attack, occurs and responds to the invasion.

The configuration and operation of the OpenFlow switch?120?will be discussed with reference to?FIG. 2?to?FIG. 5.

FIG. 2?shows a configuration of one OpenFlow switch?120?among others in accordance with an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. The OpenFlow switch?120?includes a secure channel?210, a flow table?215?and a?DDoS?attack processing apparatus?220.

The?DDoS?attack?processing apparatus?220?collects statistical information on the packet processing from the hardware part of the OpenFlow switch?120?and determines whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs on a basis of the collected statistical information on the packet processing.

When it is determined that the?DDoS?attack?has happened, the?DDoS?attack?processing apparatus?220?inspects the headers of the incoming packets or sampled packets introduced onto the hardware part so that it can respond to the?DDoSattack. More specifically, the?DDoS?attack?processing apparatus?220?determines whether the?attack?is a signature-basedDDoS?attack?or a behavior-based?DDoS?attack?through the inspection of the headers and responds to the?DDoS?attack?by processing the packets related to the?DDoS?attack, e.g., discarding the related packets in accordance with the determination.

The configuration and functionality of the?DDoS?attack?processing apparatus?220?will be described with reference to?FIG. 3.

FIG. 3?is a block diagram of a?DDoS?attack?processing apparatus?220?in accordance with an exemplary embodiment of the present invention;

Referring to?FIG. 3, the?DDoS?attack?processing apparatus?220?includes a?DDoS?attack?determination module?310, a?DDoSattack?responding module?320?and a?DDoS?attack?information collection module?330.

The?DDoS?attack?determination module?310, which is located on the hardware part of the OpenFlow switch?120, receives the statistical information on packet processing from the hardware part and determines whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs on a basis of the received statistical information on packet processing and pre-stored feature information on the?DDoS?attack. Herein, the feature information on the?DDoS?attack?may be information collected by the?DDoS?attack?information collection module?330.

The?DDoS?attack?determination module?310?may include a threshold-based?DDoS?attack?determination unit?312?for determining whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs on a basis of a predetermined threshold and a packet capture unit?314?for capturing the packets with the determination of the?DDoS?attack.

The threshold-based?DDoS?attack?determination unit?312?determines that the?DDoS?attack?had happened when there is a sudden increase in the number of packets and bytes at a specific period via the packet processing statistical information obtained every period. In other words, when the number of packets and bytes being processed at a current period is larger than a predetermined threshold in comparison with the number of packets and bytes processed at a previous period, the threshold-based?DDoS?attack?determination unit?312?determines the occurrence of the?DDoS?attack, and the packet capture unit?314?captures the incoming packets introduced into the OpenFlow switch?120?to provide the captured packets to the?DDoS?attack?responding module?320. In this regard, the predetermined threshold may be dynamically set in line with a network situation.

The?DDoS?attack?responding module?320?analyzes the increase in a traffic ratio from the captured packets and perceives the signature-based?DDoS?attack?with the analyzed traffic ratio, thereby responding to the signature-based?DDoS?attack.

Further, the?DDoS?attack?responding module?320?analyzes the features of the captured packets if the?attack?is not the signature-based?DDoS?attack?and perceives the behavior-based?DDoS?attack?with the analyzed feature, thereby responding to the behavior-based?DDoS?attack.

The?DDoS?attack?responding module?320?includes a signature-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?322?and a behavior-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?324.

The signature-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?322?may respond to a standardized type of?DDoS?attacks. That is, the signature-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?322?analyzes the increase in the traffic ratio from the captured packets to perceive the feature of the signature-based?DDoS?attack. Herein, the traffic may include ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) traffic, TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) traffic, UDP (User Datagram Protocol) traffic, HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) traffic and the like, and the analysis of the traffic ratio increase may be made through the comparison between the predetermined threshold and the increased traffic ratio of the overall traffics in the OpenFlow switch.

The signature-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?322?performs a disposal process for the incoming packets when the feature of the signature-based?DDoS?attack?is detected, thereby responding to the signature-based?DDoS?attack.

The behavior-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?324?responds to an unstandardized type of?DDoS?attacks. That is, the behavior-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?324?perceives the?attack?to be the unstandardized type of?DDoS?attacks, i.e., the behavior-based?DDoS?attack?if the?attack?is not the signature-based?DDoS?attack, thereby responding to the behavior-based?DDoS?attack.

The behavior-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?324?responds to the behavior-based?DDoS?attack?by discarding the incoming packets when the feature of the behavior-based?DDoS?attack?is perceived.

Meanwhile, the feature of signature-based?DDoS?attack?or the behavior-based?DDoS?attack?may be provided to the information collection module?330.

The information collection module?330?includes an information collection unit?322?for collecting the feature of the?DDoSattack?obtained in the course of responding to the?DDoS?attack?and an information database?334?that stores the collected features.

The feature information stored in the information collection unit?332?may be provided to the?DDoS?attack?determination module?310?and the?DDoS?attack?responding module?320. In response thereto, the?DDoS?attack?determination module?310can update information necessary for determining whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs, and the?DDoS?attack?responding module?320?can update information necessary for responding to the?DDoS?attack.

A process in which the OpenFlow controller?110?determines whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs and responds to the?DDoSattack?will be described with reference to?FIG. 4.

FIG. 4?illustrates a flow chart of a process for determining and responding to the?DDoS?attack?performed by the OpenFlow controller?110?in accordance with an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to?FIG. 4, the OpenFlow switch?120?processes the packets on the hardware part in operation?402?and transfers the statistical information on the packet processing, for example, the number of processed packets and bytes every predetermined period onto the software part in operation?404.

In response thereto, the?DDoS?attack?determination module?310?residing on the software part determines whether theDDoS?attack?occurs on a basis of the transferred statistical information in operation?406. For example, the threshold-basedDDoS?attack?determination unit?312?may determine whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs by comparing between the predetermined threshold and the number of the packets and bytes received at current as compared to the number of packets and bytes transferred at a current period. That is, it may be determined that the?DDoS?attack?has begun in a case where the number of packets and bytes transferred at the current period is greater than the predetermined threshold.

As a result of the determination in operation?406, if it is determined that the?DDoS?attack?has happened, the?DDoS?attackdetermination module?310?activates the?DDoS?attack?responding module?320?in operation?408, and thus the?DDoS?attackresponding module?320?responds to the?DDoS?attack?targeting the incoming packets introduced into the OpenFlow switch120?or the sampled packets while residing at the hardware part in operation?410.

Meanwhile, as the result of the determination in operation?406, if it is determined that none?DDoS?attack?has happened, a process returns to the operation?402?to repeat the above operations. In other words, the OpenFlow switches?120processes the incoming packets based on the information in the flow table?215?and transfers the statistical information on the packets processed every period onto the software part.

A process of responding to the?DDoS?attack?to be performed in operation?410?will be described with reference to?FIG. 5.

FIG. 5?illustrates a flow chart of a process for responding to the?DDoS?attack?in accordance with an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to?FIG. 5, the?DDoS?attack?responding module?320?determines whether the?attack?is the signature-based?attackthrough the use of the signature-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?322. More specifically, the signature-based?DDoSattack?responding unit?322?calculates a ratio of the ICMP traffics to the total traffics in the OpenFlow switch?120?in operation?502?and determines whether the calculated ratio of the ICMP traffics is larger than a predetermined threshold of the ICMP traffic ratio in operation?504.

As a result of the determination in operation?504, if the calculated ratio of the ICMP traffics is larger than the predetermined threshold of the ICMP traffic ratio, the signature-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?322?determines that the?attack?is the signature-based?attack, discards the ICMP related packets of the incoming packets and provides the feature information of the ICMP?DDoS?attack?to the?DDoS?attack?information collection module?330?in operation?506. In response thereto, theDDoS?attack?information collection module?330?stores the feature information of the ICMP?DDoS?attack?in the information database?334?in operation?508.

Meanwhile, as a result of the determination in operation?504, if the calculated ratio of the ICMP traffics is equal to or less than the predetermined threshold of the ICMP traffic ratio, the signature-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?322?calculates a ratio of the TCP traffics to the total traffics in operation?510?and determines whether the calculated ratio of the TCP traffics is larger than a predetermined threshold of the TCP traffic ratio in operation?512.

As a result of the determination in operation?512, if the calculated ratio of the TCP traffics is larger than the predetermined threshold of the TCP traffic ratio, the signature-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?322?determines that the?attack?is the TCP?attack, that is, TCP flooding, discards the TCP related packets of the incoming packets and provides the feature information of the TCP?DDoS?attack?to the?DDoS?attack?information collection module?330?in operation?514. In response thereto, the?DDoS?attack?information collection module?330?stores the feature information of the TCP?DDoS?attack?in the information database?334?in operation?508.

Meanwhile, as a result of the determination in operation?512, if the calculated ratio of the TCP traffics is equal to or less than the predetermined threshold of the TCP traffic ratio, the signature-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?322?calculates a ratio of the UDP traffics to the total traffics in operation?516?and determines whether the calculated ratio of the UDP traffics is larger than a predetermined threshold of the UDP traffic ratio in operation?518.

As a result of the determination in operation?518, if the calculated ratio of the UDP traffics is larger than the predetermined threshold of the UDP traffic ratio, the signature-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?322?determines that the?attack?is the UDP?attack, that is, UDP flooding, discards the UDP related packets of the incoming packets and provides the feature information of the UDP?DDoS?attack?to the?DDoS?attack?information collection module?330?in operation?520. In response thereto, the?DDoS?attack?information collection module?330?stores the feature information of the UDP?DDoS?attack?in the information database?334?in operation?508.

Meanwhile, as a result of the determination in operation?518, if the calculated ratio of the UDP traffics is equal to or less than the predetermined threshold of the UDP traffic ratio, the signature-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?322?calculates a ratio of the HTTP traffics to the total traffics in operation?522?and determines whether the calculated ratio of the HTTP traffics is larger than a predetermined threshold of the HTTP traffic ratio in operation?524.

As a result of the determination in operation?524, if the calculated ratio of the HTTP traffics is larger than the predetermined threshold of the HTTP traffic ratio, the signature-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?322?determines that the?attack?is the HTTP?attack, that is, HTTP flooding, discards the HTTP related packets of the incoming packets and provides the feature information of the HTTP?DDoS?attack?to the?DDoS?attack?information collection module?330?in operation?526. In response thereto, the?DDoS?attack?information collection module?330?stores the feature information on the HTTP?DDoS?attack?in the information database?334?in operation?508.

Meanwhile, as a result of the determination in operation?524, if the calculated ratio of the HTTP traffics is equal to or less than the predetermined threshold of the HTTP traffic ratio, the signature-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?322determines that the?attack?is not the signature-based?attack?to trigger the operation of the information database?334?in operation?528.

In response thereto, the behavior-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?324?analyzes all the packets introduced into the OpenFlow switches?120?or sampled packets to determine whether the?attack?is the behavior-based?attack?in operation?530.

If, in the operation?530, the?attack?is the behavior-based?attack, the behavior-based?DDoS?attack?responding unit?324performs a disposal process for all the packets exploited in the behavior-based?DDoS?attack?and provides the feature information on the behavior-based?DDoS?attack?to the?DDoS?attack?information collection module?330?in operation?532. In response thereto, the?DDoS?attack?information collection module?330?stores the feature information on the behavior-basedDDoS?attack?in the information database?334?in operation?508.

The feature information of the?DDoS?attacks stored in the information database?334?may be provided to the?DDoS?attackdetermination module?310?and the?DDoS?attack?responding module?320?so that they can utilize the feature information as a reference data to determine whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs and responds to the?DDoS?attack.

As mentioned above, in accordance with the exemplary embodiments of the present invention, an apparatus for determining whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs and responding to the?DDoS?attack?is installed in the respective OpenFlow switches so that the switches itself determines whether the?DDoS?attack?occurs and responds to the?DDoS?attack, thereby not only minimizing the load due to the massive messages sent to the OpenFlow controller?110?at the time of the?DDoS?attack?but also rapidly responding to the?DDoS?attack.

While the invention has been shown and described with respect to the preferred embodiments, the present invention is not limited thereto. It will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications may be made without departing from the scope of the invention as defined in the following claims.

SRC=https://www.google.com.hk/patents/US20140189867

DDoS ATTACK PROCESSING APPARATUS AND METHOD IN OPENFLOW SWITCH